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Ever since the early days of quantum mechanics it has been suggested that consciousness
could be linked to the collapse of the wave function. However, no detailed account of such
an interplay is usually provided. In this paper we present an objective collapse model (a
variation of CSL) where the collapse operator depends on integrated information, which has
been argued to measure consciousness. By doing so, we construct an empirically adequate
scheme in which superpositions of conscious states are dynamically suppressed. Unlike other
proposals in which “consciousness causes the collapse of the wave function,” our model is
fully consistent with a materialistic view of the world and does not require the postulation
of entities suspicious of laying outside of the quantum realm.
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics is often claimed to be the most successful physical theory ever con-
structed. It has an astonishing predictive power, continuously confirmed by empirical re-
sults. However, it remains controversial how the physical reality it describes is supposed to
be portrayed. Particularly puzzling is the fact that quantum mechanics is committed to the
superposition principle, which holds that any two possible quantum states of a system can be
added together to form another legitimate quantum state—a superposition thereof.
Although we can indeed observe the manifestation of such superpositions—as in the
double-slit experiment—it seems there are at least some superpositions we fail to observe
directly. The quantum formalism allows for the superposition of, say, a chair being in two
different places, but we never come to observe such states. In standard presentations of the
theory (e.g., Dirac (1930); von Neumann (1932)), this fact is accommodated by the collapse
postulate, which states that, when we observe or measure a superposed state, like the one of
the chair above, it collapses to one option or the other. The problem now turns into deciding
when an observation or measurement happens, as this is not specified by the theory.2
It is natural to link the notion of observation with consciousness, an idea that has been
floating in the air since the early days of quantum mechanics. von Neumann (1932) argued
that the mathematical formalism underlying quantum mechanics allows for the collapse of
the wave function to be placed at any point in the causal chain between the measurement
device and our “subjective perception.” Following this suggestion, London and Bauer (1939)
1This is a fully collaborative paper; authors appear in alphabetical order.
2The standard theory not only does not specify when a measurement happens, it also does not prescribe
what it is that is being measured (i.e., in which basis will the collapse occur).
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maintain that the collapse happens at the latter point in the causal chain, when consciousness
takes place—an idea famously developed in Wigner (1967). Wigner holds that conscious
states, unlike other states, do not admit superpositions. This in turn requires consciousness
not to be a physical property or, at the very least, to be different from other physical properties
in this respect. Other authors, such as Chalmers and McQueen (MS); Stapp (2005, 2007),
have more recently defended ideas along these lines.
Interpretations of quantum mechanics according to which “consciousness causes the col-
lapse of the wave function” face several problems. Many have found the commitment with
mysterious non-physical entities unattractive. Moreover, if conscious states were indeed non-
physical, then these theories would be committed to the existence of a mysterious interaction
between consciousness and the physical world. This seems in conflict with certain basic prin-
ciples of physics, such as the principle of energy conservation (cf. Averill and Keating (1981);
Larmer (1986)), and would violate the common presupposition in scientific practices that the
physical world is causally closed. On the other hand, if consciousness were something physi-
cal, it would remain mysterious how it would interact with the rest of the physical world and
a description of the laws governing such an interaction would be forthcoming. The problem
is that developing such dynamics is far from straightforward.
For instance, it seems reasonable to assume (with Wigner) that consciousness does not
admit superpositions. However, as has been recently pointed out in Chalmers and McQueen
(MS), this would be inconsistent with another reasonable assumption, namely, that collapses
occur when systems get entangled with conscious beings (because if consciousness does not
superpose, then it cannot get entangled). Moreover, if consciousness never superposes, and if
the intervention of consciousness is what determines the precise moment at which the collapse
of the wave function occurs, then one would run into trouble with the quantum Zeno effect
(Dagasperis et al. (1974)), which holds that frequent enough measurements effectively freeze
the evolution of a system. Therefore, the effect would imply that it would not be possible for
observed systems to evolve, and therefore, for our experience of the external world to change
though time as it does.
In order to overcome some of these issues, still in the spirit of a theory in which con-
sciousness is related to the collapse of the wave function, Chalmers and McQueen propose
the introduction of what they call m-properties, whose superpositions are postulated either
to be either forbiden, or to be “unstable” or “more likely to collapse.” Moreover, they pro-
pose that some physical correlate of consciousness, such as integration of information (which
Integrated Information Theory associates with consciousness, Tononi (2004)) could be an m-
property. Note however that, in order for a theory that allows superpositions of consciousness
to work, one would need to ensure for superpositions of different conscious states to quickly
evolve into states of well-defined consciousness, in such a way that we would fail to notice
these transitions in our experience. Moreover, it is key to recognize that, in order to have
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a satisfactory explanation of our observations, it is not sufficient to suppress superposition
of conscious states, for this is still compatible with the existence of well-defined states of
consciousness that correspond to the superposition of macroscopic properties—which we do
not seem to experience. Therefore, a scheme along this lines would also have to somehow
block these states.
In this paper we introduce a fully materialistic, mathematically precise, consciousness-
based collapse model that solves all the issues mentioned above. In particular, we present
an objective collapse scheme, a version of CSL, where the collapse operator depends on
integrated information (which, as we said, has been argued to measure consciousness). By
doing so, we arrive at a detailed proposal, in which superpositions of conscious states are
dynamically suppressed in a way that is fully compatible with experience. As a result, we
provide a way to fill a gap that consciousness-based interpretations have systematically left
behind, greatly contributing to their unpopularity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the measurement prob-
lem, briefly reviews the taxonomy of alternatives to address it and focuses on the objective
collapse program. Then, with a consciousness-based model in mind, in section 3 we explore
the notion of integration of information, a concept that Integrated Information Theory as-
sociates with consciousness. We do not intend to offer a defense of such a theory, but we
present it in some detail in order to motivate the relation between integration of informa-
tion and consciousness. Finally, in section 4 we describe in detail our consciousness-based
objective collapse model, consider potential problems and explore ways to overcome them.
In particular, we examine issues derived from the possibility of having well-defined states of
consciousness that correspond to macroscopic superpositions and describe an evolutionary
solution to such a problem. To conclude, in section 5 we briefly compare our model with
standard collapse schemes and offer some closing remarks.
2 The measurement problem
A common way to introduce the measurement problem starts by calling attention to the fact
that the standard formulation of quantum theory contains two very different evolution laws:
the linear and deterministic Schrödinger equation and the non-linear and indeterministic
collapse process, which interrupts the former during measurements. The problem arises
because, as John Stewart Bell convincingly argued in Bell (1990), higher-level notions, such
as measurements, should not appear as primitives in a theory that aims at being fundamental.
This and other complications with the collapse postulate have motivated attempts to do
without it. However, such a move seems to lead to a related problem, often also referred to
as the measurement problem. To see this, assume that everything, always evolves according
to the Schrödinger equation and consider a standard measurement scenario of, say, the spin
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along z of a spin-1/2 particle. Let us look, then, at a measurement apparatus (which, as
everything else, evolves according to the Schrödinger equation) that behaves as
|R〉M |+〉p Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |+〉M |+〉p and |R〉M |−〉p Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |−〉M |−〉p, (1)
where |R〉M is its ready state and with |+〉M and |−〉M the states where the apparatus displays
spin-up and spin-down as the result of the experiment. In other words, the apparatus correctly
tracks the |+〉p and |−〉p spin states of the particle and reacts accordingly.
Next, we ask what happens if the apparatus is fed with a particle in a superposition of
|+〉p and |−〉p. Notice that the linearity of the Schrödinger equation implies
|R〉M {α|+〉p + β|−〉p} Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ α|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉M |−〉p, (2)
which means that the apparatus itself will end up in a superposition of displaying spin-up
and spin-down. Such a state seems at odds with experience. To drive the point home, we can
introduce an observer (which is also assumed to evolve according to the Schrödinger equa-
tion) that looks at the apparatus during the measurement. The linearity of the Schrödinger
equation, once more, leads to a superposition, this time of the observer perceiving spin-up
and spin-down as the result of the experiment. That is
|R〉O|R〉M {α|+〉p + β|−〉p} Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ α|+〉O|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉O|−〉M |−〉p, (3)
where |R〉O is the state of the observer in which she is ready to look at the result displayed by
the apparatus and |+〉O and |−〉O are the states in which she perceives that the results where
spin-up and spin-down, respectively (we are making the very reasonable assumption that the
state of the observer correctly tracks the state of the macroscopic system). The problem with
all this, of course, is that the final state in equation (3), which describes a superposition of
perceptions, does not seem to correspond with what we experience when we perform such an
experiment; or, as David Albert puts it in (Albert, 1992, p. 78-79), such a state “is at odds
with what we know of ourselves by direct introspection.”
Note however that this strange discrepancy between the predictions of a theory with pure
Schrödinger evolution on the one hand, and our experience on the other, crucially depends
on interpreting the quantum state along the lines of the so-called Eigenvector-Eigenvalue
(EE) link. Such a rule states that a physical system possesses the value α for a property
represented by the operator O if and only if the quantum state assigned to the system is
an eigenstate of O with eigenvalue α. In other words, if a state is represented by a given
vector and such a vector is an eigenstate of the operator that represents a property, then we
can claim that the system possesses a defined value for such a property and that its value
is the corresponding eigenvector. Likewise, if a system possesses a defined value for some
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property, then, the vector which represents its state must be an eigenstate of the operator
which represents such a property. The point is that only if one interprets quantum states
along these lines, one has to read the final state in equation (3) as one in which the observer
does not have a well-defined perception. It follows that if one interprets the quantum state
differently, one could escape the measurement problem.
One such an alternative interpretation, first introduced by Hugh Everett III in Everett
(1957), proposes to read the final state in equation (3) not as a state in which the observer
does not have a well-defined perception, but one in which the observer simultaneously, but
independently, has both perceptions. That is, one in which the observer, as Michael Lockwood
puts it in (Lockwood, 1996, p. 166) “is literally in two minds”. It is very important to notice,
though, that an interpretation along the lines of the Eigenvector-Eigenvalue link is crucial in
the process of extracting concrete predictions from the theory (because it is such a tool that
allows to connect statements regarding what the quantum state is with statements regarding
what obtains in the world). Therefore, if one changes the interpretation, one has to make
sure that the alternative one also leads to empirically successful predictions—something not
at all clear under the interpretation suggested by Everett (see, e.g., (Saunders et al., 2010,
sec. 4)).
Alternatively, one could escape interpreting the final state in equation (3) as one in which
the observer does not have a well-defined perception by adding extra elements to the picture—
such as Bohmian particles—that determine which of the two terms of the superposition
actually obtains in the world (see Goldstein (2013)). This is certainly a promising path, but
in this work we will focus on alternatives that assume that the quantum state is complete.
Going back to the measurement problem, it is one thing to try to pinpoint exactly what
it consists of and another to be clear about what a satisfactory solution to the problem looks
like. Regarding the latter, probably a far more useful task than the former, one could say
that a satisfactory solution to the measurement problem consists of a formalism which:
1. Is fully formulated in precise, mathematical terms (with notions such as measurement,
observer or macroscopic not being part of the fundamental language of the theory).
2. Reproduces the empirical success of standard quantum mechanics at the microscopic
level.
3. Explains why certain macroscopic superpositions allowed by the theory never seem to
occur.
The last point needs a bit of unpacking. First of all, it is very important to highlight
an often overlooked distinction between a superposition of perceptions and a perception of a
superposition. That is, between:
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• A superposition of incompatible perceptions, such as the final state in equation (3):
α|+〉O|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉O|−〉M |−〉p.
• A well-defined perception of a macroscopic system in a superposition of different posi-
tions: |S〉O {α|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉M |−〉p} = |S〉O|S〉M+p (where |S〉M+p ≡ α|+〉M |+〉p +
β|−〉M |−〉p and |S〉O corresponds to a state in which the observer experiences a well-
defined perception of the measurement apparatus displaying a superposition of spin-up
and spin-down).
Regarding the first scenario, we have already explained how it may arise and why it represents
a problem. Regarding the second, the point is that, from the quantum point of view, both
|S〉M+p and |S〉O are states which are on a par with states such as |+〉O or |+〉M |+〉p, and
the only reason they may seems strange, different or unacceptable is because we in fact do
not experience them. The key question, of course, is why? One could question whether |S〉O
is in fact a state of well-defined perception. Well, maybe it is not, and we will have more to
say about it latter, but what is clear is that |S〉O is not a superposition of other states of
well-defined perception, such as α|+〉O + β|−〉O, and that, if it turns out not to be a state of
well-defined perception, an explanation of such a fact would be required.
To sum up, states such as |S〉O or |S〉M+p are perfectly valid from the fundamental,
quantum point of view and a satisfactory quantum formalism is required to explain, in precise
mathematical terms, why no one has ever reported experiencing states of that kind. That is,
we never seem to experience well-defined conscious states that correspond to a superposition
of external macroscopic objects, such as chairs, being in two positions. It is in fact common
to find two different explanations for this, both having to do with decoherence and both
problematic.3 The first one asserts that we cannot be sure that we never experience states
such as |S〉O because, for that, we would need to perform an interference experiment with a
macroscopic object and decoherence gets in the way. The problem with such an answer is that
it equivocates between a superposition of perceptions and a perception of a superposition (see
bullets above). The point is that some type of an Everettian move plus decoherence could
probably explain why a state such as the final one on equation (3) is perceived as both terms
of the superposition independently, but it has absolutely nothing to say about why would
something similar happen with |S〉O. The second explanation often offered for why no one
has ever reported experiencing states such as |S〉M+p is that, because of decoherence, they
are somehow dynamically suppressed. This is something that is nowadays extremely common
to read or hear, the problem is that it never comes with adequate backing (see (Okon and
Sudarsky, 2016a, sec. 2)). At any rate, we will have more to say about this below.
Returning to the issue of finding a satisfactory quantum theory, it is clear that the stan-
3Decoherence studies the consequences of the inevitable interaction between a quantum system and its
macroscopic environment.
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dard interpretation of quantum mechanics does not qualify as one because it does not meet
point 1 of the list: collapses occur upon measurements. However, as we will see in the next
subsection, there are more acceptable ways to introduce collapses into the picture.
2.1 Objective collapse models
With the measurement problem in mind, objective collapse (or dynamical reduction) models
aim at constructing a single dynamical equation that adequately encompasses both the stan-
dard unitary evolution and the collapse mechanism. The idea is to add non-linear, stochastic
terms to the Schrödinger equation in such a way that the behavior at the microscopic level is
not significantly altered (with respect to the standard framework), but where embarrassing
macroscopic superpositions are effectively suppressed.
In the simplest collapse model, know as GRW (Ghirardi et al. (1986)), all elementary
particles are postulated to suffer, with mean frequency λGRW , spontaneous localization events
around randomly chosen positions. The localizations are implemented by a multiplication
of the wave function by narrow Gaussians, with centers selected according to a probability
distribution that mimics the Born rule. Given that the collapse frequency of an object is
proportional to the number of particles it contains, a macroscopic object will be highly likely
to suffer collapses even if λGRW is extremely small (which is needed for the microscopic
behavior not to be affected significantly). Moreover, given that it is enough for one of the
particles of a macroscopic superposition (such as that in the final state in equation (3)) to
get localized, for the whole state to collapse, the GRW model ensures a quick elimination
of superpositions of well-localized macroscopic states, with statistics in accordance with the
standard theory.
The Continuous Spontaneous Localization model, or CSL (Pearle (1989)), replaces the
discontinuous GRW jumps with a continuous, stochastic evolution equation. In more detail,
it adds specific non-linear, stochastic terms to the Schrödinger equation designed to drive
any initial wave function into one of the eigenstate of a, so-called, collapse operator. In the
simplest case, the solutions to the CSL equation are given by
|ψ(t)〉B = e
−
{
iH+ 14λt [B(t)−2λAˆ]
2
}
|ψ(0)〉 (4)
with λ a free parameter that controls the strength of the stochastic terms, Aˆ the collapse
operator and B(t) a classical Brownian motion function selected randomly with probability
density
Pt{B} = B〈ψ(t)|ψ(t)〉B. (5)
Note that the first term in the exponent corresponds to the standard Schrödinger evolution
and the rest are the additional stochastic terms that implement the collapse.
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To see how the model works, we expand the initial state at the right-hand-side of equation
(4) in terms of a superposition of eigenstates of Aˆ
|ψ(0)〉 =
∑
i
ci|ai〉 (6)
and, taking for simplicity H = 0, we arrive at
|ψ(t)〉B =
∑
i
cie
− 14λt [B(t)−2λtai]2 |ai〉 (7)
and
Pt{B} =
∑
i
e−
1
2λ [B(t)−2λtai]2 |ci|2. (8)
From the last equation we note that the most probable B(t)’s to occur are B(t) ≈ 2λtaj with
probabilities |ci|2, in which case
|ψ(t)〉B ≈ cj |aj〉+
∑
i 6=j
e−2λt[ai−aj ]
2 |ai〉 t→∞−−−→ cj |aj〉. (9)
Therefore, as t→∞, the CSL dynamics drives the state of the system into the j-th eigenstate
of the operator Aˆ, with probability |cj |2; that is, it unifies the standard unitary evolution
with a “measurement” of such an observable.
Given the nature of these models, one could worry for them to suffer a problem similar to
the Zeno effect, in which systems get forever frozen on eigenstates of the collapse operator.
Note however that the full time-evolution under these models contains both the standard
unitary component (first term in the exponent of equation (4)) and the collapse mechanism
(second term of the exponent of equation (4)), so the actual evolution of a system involves
a competition between the two. Of course, the result of this struggle is to be decided by the
strength of the collapse terms, which is determined by the parameter λ, so the key question is
if there is a possible value for λ that avoids these problems and yields empirically successful
predictions.
More generally, the value of the collapse parameter has to satisfy several constraints. On
the one hand, λ cannot be too large; otherwise, microscopic phenomena, which we know are
well-described by a purely unitary evolution, would get disturbed. Moreover, a large λ would
lead to the Zeno-type problem in which the collapse terms would dominate and eigenstates
of the collapse operator would freeze. On the other hand, if λ is too small, these models
would not achieve their purpose of suppressing undesirable macroscopic superpositions. Of
course, one can allow for these macroscopic superpositions to persist for some time, but one
need to make sure for them to quickly die-out before we are able to notice them. Well, the
beauty of these collapse models is that there exists a possible range of values for λ that yields
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the required equilibrium, i.e., that provides us with fully empirically successful models of the
world around us (see Adler (2007); Feldmann and Tumulka (2012); Bassi et al. (2013).4
Going back to CSL, note than, unlike GRW, which is by construction associated with
the position basis, it allows the freedom to select different collapse operators. However, Aˆ
is usually chosen to be associated with the position operator. That is because, as in GRW,
such an option leads to the suppression of superpositions of macroscopic objects at different
locations, and thus to a solution to the measurement problem. In fact, it has even been
argued that this is the only option available (see Bassi and Ghirardi (2003)). However, we
will show that a very different choice for a collapse operator can also lead to a solution of the
measurement problem.
The point is that, in order to explain why we never perceive superposed macroscopic ob-
jects, at least two options are available: one can construct models in which such macroscopic
superpositions never occur (as in standard collapse theories) or one can maintain that, al-
though such superpositions do occur, we never encounter them because they collapse a soon
as we observe them. Below we will explore this second group of alternatives and present a
version of CSL in which the collapse operator relates to consciousness. This of course requires
the construction of an operator that measures consciousness and, for this purpose, we will
follow Integrated Information Theory and employ a measure of integration of information.
In order to motivate the relation between integration of information and consciousness, in
the next section we present such a theory in some detail.
3 Integration of Information and Consciousness
Integrated Information Theory (henceforth IIT) is a novel theory of consciousness proposed
in 2004 by Giulio Tononi (Tononi (2004, 2008); Oizumi et al. (2014)). The theory has gained
popularity in recent years, especially in neuroscience, where it has even attracted the attention
of some renowned neuroscientists in the field of consciousness studies, such as Christopher
Kock (see, e.g., Tononi and Koch (2015)).
The core idea behind IIT is that consciousness, at the fundamental level, is integrated
information, which is described as “the amount of information generated by a complex
of elements, above and beyond the information generated by its parts” (Tononi, 2008, p.
4A more serious complication regarding collapse models arises from the fact that they lead systems to states
which are very close to eigenstates of the collapse operator, but not exactly to such eigenstates. Therefore,
if one subscribes to the EE link, systems under collapse dynamics never actually possess well-defined values
for properties associated with the collapse operator (nor for most other properties). The solution, then, is to
substitute the EE link by something else. One alternative is the, so-called, fuzzy link interpretation introduced
in Albert and Loewer (1996), in which one allows for some tolerance away from an eigenstate while ascribing
the possession of well-defined properties. Another alternative is to construct out of the wave function a,
so-called, primitive ontology, such as mass density or flashes, and to interpret such an entity as the three-
dimensional stuff that populates the world (see Allori (2015)). It fair to say, though, that these approaches,
while promising, still have some open issues to address (see, e.g., McQueen (2015)).
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216) or “information specified by a whole that cannot be reduced to that specified by its
parts”(Oizumi et al., 2014, p.1).5 In order to quantify integrated information, IIT defines
the property Φ, which is taken to measure the quantity of consciousness generated by a com-
plex of elements. The quality of experience (the particular experience we undergo) is then
associated with the set of informational relationships generated within that complex.
Tononi and colleagues derive these ideas from a set of axioms they take to be self-evident.
From those axioms they deduce what they call postulates, which are supposed to specify
conditions a system must satisfy in order to generate consciousness. For current purposes,
we can focus on three axioms that primarily motivate Φ as a measure of consciousness,
Information, Integration and Exclusion (Oizumi et al., 2014, pp.2-3):
INFORMATION: Consciousness is informative: each experience differs in its particular
way from other possible experiences. Thus, an experience of pure darkness is what
it is by differing, in its particular way, from an immense number of other possible
experiences. A small subset of these possible experiences includes, for example, all the
frames of all possible movies.
INTEGRATION: Consciousness is integrated: each experience is (strongly) irreducible to
non-interdependent components. Thus, experiencing the word “SONO” written in the
middle of a blank page is irreducible to an experience of the word “ SO” at the right
border of a half-page, plus an experience of the word “NO” on the left border of another
half page the experience is whole. Similarly, seeing a red triangle is irreducible to seeing
a triangle but no red color, plus a red patch but no triangle.
EXCLUSION: Consciousness is exclusive: each experience excludes all others – at any
given time there is only one experience having its full content, rather than a super-
position of multiple partial experiences; each experience has definite borders – certain
things can be experienced and others cannot; each experience has a particular spatial
and temporal grain.
Some readers might not find these axioms as self-evident as Tononi and colleagues pretend.
More usefully, Tononi (2008) makes use of thought experiments to make the relation between
Φ and consciousness more compelling. Imagine you are participating in an experiment where
you are facing a screen with a light that can be either on or off. Your task is to say “on”
if the light is on and “off” otherwise. The same task can be performed by a photodiode,
which can discriminate between the on and off states by changing the output current. The
photodiode can then be connected to a device that says “on” if the current is above certain
threshold and “off” otherwise. Although the photodiode can make the same discrimination
5In its latest formulation, what has been called IIT 3.0, the proponents of IIT depart slightly from Shannon’s
notion of information, which they call ‘extrinsic information,’ and focus in what they call ‘intrinsic information.’
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than you, we would not think it has any subjective experience of the process. Tononi asks
what the difference is, and replies that it lies on how much information is generated when
the distinction is made. Classically, information is defined as a reduction of uncertainty and
measured by means of Shannon’s entropy, which is roughly given by the logarithm of the
number of alternatives. Therefore, according to Tononi, the main difference between the
photodiode and us lies on the restriction in possibilities that our states make in comparison
with those of the photodiode. By being in an “on” state, the “off” state of the photodiode
is ruled out. In contrast, our experience also rules out the light being located in a different
location, being of a different color, etc. The key point, according to Tononi, is to realize how
“the many discriminations we can do, and the photodiode cannot, affect the meaning of the
discrimination at hand, the one between light and dark” (Tononi, 2008, p. 218).
The second thought experiment has to do with integration. In this case we are asked
to consider a digital camera, which contains, say, a million photodiodes like the one in the
previous example. Therefore, the camera can distinguish 21000000 different possibilities and,
clearly, we could increase the number of sensors in such a way that the camera discriminates
as many alternatives as we visually do. Yet, few would be willing to claim that the camera is
conscious. What is the difference in this case? Tononi proposes that it is the way in which we
do the discrimination. We, contrary to the camera, do it as an integrated system: “one that
cannot be broken down into independent components each with its own separate repertoire”
(Tononi, 2008, p. 219). Whereas the information of the camera can be perfectly analyzed in
terms of the information of the sensors, we cannot do this in the case of our experience, which
is always integrated (i.e., from the point of view of the experience, say, of a red triangle, it
does not make sense to take apart the experience of red from the experience of a triangle).
As we said above, in order to quantify the amount of integrated information in a system,
IIT introduces the property Φ. Although the precise mathematical calculation for Φ has been
modified over the years, the core idea, quantifying information in a system, above and beyond
that of its parts, remains the same. It is important to mention that, within the theory, the
partition of a system into separate components or mechanisms depends on the selected level
of abstraction and spatio-temporal scale. Moreover, IIT does not specify the spatio-temporal
scale at which systems have to be considered. Thereofre, Φ has to be calculated for all
possible partitions of the system, at every spatio-temporal grain, and the level that locally
maximizes Φ, attaining value ΦMax, is the one responsible for consciousness in the system
(e.g., Hoel et al. (2013) show that Φ can peak at a macroscopic, rather than microscopic,
spatio-temporal scale).6
Tononi and colleagues have focused on a simplified calculus, in which they model a system
6Calculating ΦMax might very well be beyond our cognitive capacities. However, for current purposes, the
only thing required is that, for every state of a system, there is a well-defined value of ΦMax, independently
of our capacity to come to know it.
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as a logic gate network (see Tononi (2008) for a detailed explanation of the calculus within
such a model). The idea is that logic gates offer a plausible approximation, if the neural level
is the adequate one. It is important to note that if we want to fix the behavioral disposition
of an organism, and if computationalism is correct, then it suffices to fix the computations as
described at the computational level, independently of the way in which such a computation
is realized. That is, two systems might differ with respect to the mechanisms involved at a
certain level or spatio-temporal scale (e.g., at the fundamental level), without differing in its
mechanisms at another level (e.g., the computational one).
Summing up, the property ΦMax is supposed to quantify the amount of consciousness in
a system. In the next section, we explore the quantity ΦMax at the quantum level—which we
assume to be the fundamental one—and we use it to construct a consciousness-based version
of CSL. Our model is intended to illustrate, in a conceptually and mathematically sound
manner, how consciousness could play a role in the collapse of the wave function.
4 A consciousness-based CSL model
In this section we lay out the details of our proposal. In a few words, it consists of a CSL
model with ΦMax as the collapse operator. By doing so, we arrive at a model in which, as has
been suggested throughout the years, consciousness plays a role in the collapse of the wave
function. The advantage of our proposal, of course, is that we incorporate consciousness into
quantum theory in a perfectly well-defined way, both mathematically and conceptually.
Before presenting our proposal it is important to mention that, in Kremnizer and Ranchin
(2015), a CSL model in which ΦMax plays a role is also constructed. However, in such a work
ΦMax is associated with the rate of collapse and not with the collapse operator (which is,
as in standard CSL, taken to be related to the position basis). That is, in such a model, as
in standard CSL, the collapse basis is associated with the position operator, but the rate of
collapse λ is taken to be a (monotonically increasing) function of ΦMax. The idea is that the
presence of consciousness (via a large value of ΦMax) amplifies the chance of a collapse. There
is, however, a defeating problem for current purposes with such a proposal, for it assumes
that the value of ΦMax is always well-defined. Otherwise, the rate of collapse would not
be well-defined at all times. The problem, of course, is that in the quantum context under
consideration, ΦMax, as any other property, cannot always posses a well-defined value. In
reply, one could assume that ΦMax behaves differently, but this undermined the objective of
constructing a consciousness-based quantum theory without the introduction of extraneous
entities.
The first issue to discuss is the construction of a quantum version of ΦMax. To begin with,
we remember that, according to quantum theory, to every property of a system corresponds
a Hermitian operator. Given that, as we explained above, ΦMax is a well-defined property
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of any system, then there most be a corresponding operator ΦˆMax that represents such a
property. The idea, then, is that only states with a well-defined value of ΦˆMax can be
conscious. That is, only eigenstate of ΦˆMax correspond to conscious states. Next comes the
question of how to define ΦˆMax. Given that it is supposed to measure how much information
a system contains, above and beyond that of its parts, and given that quantum entanglement
is precisely related to such an issue, it is natural to define ΦˆMax in terms of some measure
of entanglement. The standard measure of entanglement for pure states is the entanglement
entropy, but such a measure is no longer useful for mixed states. For the latter there are
a number of options, such as entanglement cost, distillable entanglement, entanglement of
formation, relative entropy, squashed entanglement or logarithmic negativity, but non of them
is standard (see Plenio and Virmani (2007) for a review). In Kremnizer and Ranchin (2015),
for instance, ΦˆMax is defined in terms of relative entropy.
Finally, there is the issue of, in order to calculate ΦMax for a given system, having to
calculate Φ for all of its parts, for all of its partitions and all possible levels of description.7
Therefore, given a quantum system, in order to calculate ΦˆMax it is necessary to consider all
its subsystems, all possible partitions of each of those subsystem and also different descriptions
of the system at all possible coarse-grainings. Needless to say, doing all this for a realistic
system is beyond present technical abilities. What is important for us, though, is that the
operator ΦˆMax is guaranteed to exist.
Putting all together, for a given initial state |ψ(0)〉, the CSL model we propose has as
solutions
|ψ(t)〉B = e
−
{
iH+ 14λt [B(t)−2λΦˆMax]
2
}
|ψ(0)〉 (10)
with B(t) a classical Brownian motion function selected randomly with probability density
Pt{B} = B〈ψ(t)|ψ(t)〉B. (11)
Therefore, our model is such that it drives any initial state of a system into an eigenstate
of the ΦˆMax operator. If well-defined values of ΦˆMax are indeed related to conscious states,
then, in the same way that standard CSL quickly destroys Schrödinger cat states, the above
dynamics quickly kills superpositions of incompatible conscious states, leading to states of
well-defined consciousness.
Looking back at the list of necessary components of a satisfactory solution to the mea-
surement problem presented in section 2, we see that, so far, our model seems promising. To
begin with, it is fully formulated in precise, mathematical terms and, as long as the CSL pa-
rameter is small enough, it reduces to standard quantum mechanics at the microscopic level.
7Here we are assuming a physicalist position according to which all possible levels of description of a system,
e.g., chemical, biological, economical, etc., are, at the end of the day, already present (albeit in an extremely
complicated way) in the fundamental, quantum mechanical description.
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Regarding an explanation of why we never seem to encounter certain macroscopic super-
positions allowed by the standard theory, above we made an important distinction between
two different scenarios to explain away: i) superpositions of incompatible perceptions and ii)
well-defined perceptions of a macroscopic system in a superposition of different positions. It
is clear that our model takes care of the first complication by not letting those states last for
long. As with standard collapse schemes, one could worry that our model could lead either
to a Zeno-type problem, in which conscious states freeze, or to superpositions of conscious
states that we could actually experience. However, the same value for the collapse parameter
λ that allows for the construction of empirically successful standard collapse models, would
also do the trick here.8
One might find puzzling the idea of there being superpositions of conscious states that
we fail to notice. However, it is easy to make sense of the distinction between the experience
we have and what we notice, by means of the conceptual distinction between consciousness
and cognitive access—or between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (Block,
2002). The point is that the things we come to “notice” depend upon the availability of
information for thought. Although we often say, in ordinary language, that we are conscious
of such and such, just in case we “notice” such and such, the term ‘consciousness’ in the
discussion refers exclusively to our subjective experience. It is then an open empirical question
whether the mechanisms that underlie our subjective experience depend upon those that make
the information available for thougth. And there is strong empirical evidence—endorsed by
the proponents of IIT (Tononi and Koch, 2015)—suggesting a response in the negative (Block,
2011, 2014; Sebastián, 2014). In this case, just as there are changes in the external world
we miss because they are too quick for our perceptual system to register them,9 if the time
during which our conscious states enter into a superposition is short enough—something that
depends, as we have seen, upon the value of the collapse parameter λ—we would miss that
as they are too quick for the corresponding access-process to register them: for us to notice
them.10
Above we mentioned that there are two different scenarios involving macroscopic super-
positions that we need to explain away and we explained how our model takes care of the first
8A related worry is that it would be hard for consciousness to evolve in the early universe because the
collapse mechanics would freeze it at an eigenstate with ΦMax = 0. However, the situation, again, is completely
analogous with standard, position-based CSL, which of course can be applied to the early universe without
implying that the universe would freeze at some eigenstate of position and nothing would ever move (see
Cañate et al. (2013); Okon and Sudarsky (2014, 2016b) for successful applications of standard CSL to the
early universe).
9What “too quick” means in this case depends on the luminance (Bloch, 1885; Scharnowski et al., 2007).
10One may also worry about the fact that our model does not really lead systems to eigenstates of ΦˆMax,
but only to state which are very close to those eigenstates. As with standard collapse models, if one strictly
follows the EE link one gets into trouble because you would have to conclude that our model leads to a scenario
in which conscious states never actually occur. The solution, again, as with standard collapse models, is to
deviate from the EE link and introduce some type of fuzzy link that ascribes consciousness to states which
are close enough to ΦˆMax eigenstates. How to define such a “close enough” is still an open question.
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one, namely, superpositions of different perceptions. As we will see below, dealing with the
second one, i.e., well-defined perceptions of macroscopic superpositions, is more complicated.
The problem is that states such as |S〉O|S〉M+p are not suppressed by the model. What we
need, then, is a way of restricting the number of accessible states. Below we will propose an
evolutionary explanation for this restriction.
4.1 Well-defined perceptions of a macroscopic superposition
Supposes an observer measures the spin of a particle. In order for our model to correctly
predict the fact that she will end up either observing spin-up or spin-down, one has to further
assume that the states |+〉O and |−〉O are eigenstates of ΦˆMax. The problem is that it could
very well be that this is not the case and that the eigenstates of ΦˆMax are superpositions of
such states. That is, there is nothing in the theory to select such a basis over others. It is
an empirical fact, however, that when we perform this type of experiments we end up with
perceptions corresponding to |+〉O or |−〉O so it seems to be the architecture of our brain
that selects such a basis. The point however is that once we assume that |+〉O and |−〉O
are eigenstates of ΦˆMax, it follows that superpositions thereof are not (assuming of course no
degeneracy). As we explained above, though, this does not mean that states such as |S〉O
are superpositions of states such as |+〉O and |−〉O. As we said, |S〉O is, by assumption, an
eigenstate of ΦˆMax corresponding to a well-defined perception of a macroscopic superposition
and nothing we have said so far explains why we do not seem to experience such states.
As we mentioned in section 2, a common explanation for the fact that we never seem to
find ourselves in states such as |S〉O is that they are dynamically suppressed. However, the
fact that, from the fundamental point of view, |S〉O and, e.g., |+〉O, are on an equal footing,
makes it hard to see where does the equivalence between them could break. Of course, as
is well-known, decoherence is supposed to come to the rescue. The idea is that a preferred
basis is selected by the fact that all states inevitable interact with their environment. In
particular, it is argued that only states that are not modified by such an interaction are
stable and, therefore, observable. More formally, the preferred basis {|ψi〉} is supposed to be
the one that satisfies
|ψi〉|E0〉 Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |ψi〉|Ei〉 (12)
with 〈Ei|Ej〉 ≈ 0, where |E0〉 is the initial state of the environment and |Ek〉 is the state of
the environment which results from the fact that the state of the system is |ψk〉. Therefore,
if the initial state of the system is a superposition of elements of such a basis,
∑
i
ci|ψi〉|E0〉 Schrödinger−−−−−−−→
∑
i
ci|ψi〉|Ei〉 (13)
and the system becomes entangled with the environment, supposedly leading to the unob-
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servability of such states. Okon and Sudarsky (2016a) describe in detail why all this does
not constitute a valid explanation for the fact that we do not seem to observe macroscopic
objects on superpositions.11 Here, though, we will employ some elements of the decoherence
story, together with an evolutionary perspective, in order to explain why |S〉O never seems
to occur.
Suppose that an observer closes her eyes in front of the spin measurement apparatus of
section 2, while it measures the spin of a spin-up particle. Suppose as well (for now) that
everything, always evolves according to the Schrödinger equation. Before the observer opens
her eyes, the state of the apparatus and the particle is |+〉M |+〉p. What happens when she
opens her eyes? Well, According to what we said in section 2, she will end up in the state
|+〉O (of course, the analogous thing happens with a spin-down particle).
Now consider the same exercise, but with the apparatus measuring a particle in a super-
position of spin-up and spin-down. After the measurement, the state of the apparatus and
the particle will be |S〉M+p, and the important question is what happens when the observer
opens her eyes. As we explained in section 2, what we just said about the case where the
particle is spin up or spin-down, together with the fact that the Schrödinger equation is
linear, completely determine the answer; that is, the fact that
|R〉O|+〉M |+〉p Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |+〉O|+〉M |+〉p and |R〉O|−〉M |−〉p Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |−〉O|−〉M |−〉p
(14)
necessarily implies
|R〉O|S〉M+p = |R〉O {α|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉M |−〉p} Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ α|+〉O|+〉M |+〉p+β|−〉O|−〉M |−〉p,
(15)
so the observer will end up in such a superposition, and not in the state |S〉O. Are we
done then? Have we explained why the observer does not end up with a perception of a
superposition but a superposition of perceptions (for which we already offered a solution
within our model)? Not really. The key point to observe is that the asymmetry between
|±〉O and |S〉O, which is what we are after, has been simply put in by hand by assuming
that equation (14) is correct. The problem is that, from the fundamental point of view, there
is nothing to justify the postulation of such an evolution over the analogue with respect to
|S〉O, namely
|R〉O {α|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉M |−〉p} Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |S〉O {α|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉M |−〉p} . (16)
11In a nutshell, the problem is the following. The argument for the suppression of macroscopic interference
via decoherence is that, for all practical purposes, reduce density matrices of systems in interaction with
an environment behave as mixtures. However, those reduce density matrices behave as mixture only if one
assumes that, upon measurement, systems collapse à la Copenhague. Therefore, in order for the argument
to work, one basically needs to assume what one wants to prove (again, see Okon and Sudarsky (2016a) for
details).
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Of course, we seem to know from experience that (14) is reasonable and (16) is not but, as we
argued above, a satisfactory solution of the measurement problem requires an explanation of
such a fact.
To recap, we made the distinction between a superposition of incompatible perceptions
and a perception of a macroscopic superposition. The CSL model we propose takes care of
the first scenario by quickly killing such states but it does not help in suppressing the second
(note that a position basis CSL model does take care of both cases). What we need to do
now is to explain why (14), but not (16), seems to be the case.
We first note that a system that behaves as (14) can, at the same time, possess a state
|R∗〉O (as opposed to |R〉O) that behaves as
|R∗〉O {α|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉M |−〉p} Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |S〉O {α|+〉M |+〉p + β|−〉M |−〉p} . (17)
For example, in the same way that a measuring apparatus could, by turning a dial, measure
spin along different directions, the brain could have a state |R〉O that behaves as (14) and a
different state |R∗〉O that behaves as (17).
Having noticed that a brain could indeed possess two different ready states that, given
the exact same physical situation, would track the world in two different incompatible bases,
the key question to ask is if such an architecture would give any edge to a being possessing
it. The short answer is that it would not. This is because if those two ready states are indeed
available, then a superposition of them also would. But if such a superposition occurs, then
the collapse mechanics would randomly choose one or the other and only one basis would
be tracked, without the conscious being being able to control which. Moreover, it is clear
that there is in fact a continuum of bases that could be tracked (not only two, as above), so
the randomization problem we mentioned is even worse. So, we can conclude that a brain
architecture that tracks system along a single basis is greatly superior, and hence very likely
selected in evolution.
Another way in which a system could, at the same time, behave as (14) and as (17) is
by having within it one module with a state |R〉O that behaves as (14) and another module
with a state |R∗〉O that behaves as (17). That is, one could have a module that ends up
either in |+〉O or |−〉O as a result of looking at the measuring device and a different module
that ends up in |S〉O as a result of the very same interaction. In other words, in principle we
could possesses two different modules that track the same property in different bases, such
that both inputs contribute to the final experience. The key question, again, is if such an
architecture would give any edge to a being possessing it, and the answer, again, is that it
would not. That is because, by trying to perceive things with both modules at the same
time, no reliable information would be gathered. This is analogous to an apparatus which is
supposed to measure at the same time spin along x and y of a particle. Of course, since those
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two properties do not commute, such an apparatus would end up not giving information with
respect to either property.
Moreover, this possibility does not even start to make sense in IIT, which we are taken
for granted. We should not think of our overall state of consciousness, within the theory,
as an aggregation of conscious states. As we have seen, the exclusion postulate states at
the system level that, for a system, there is a unique conceptual structure that gives rise
to consciousness, and therefore that constellations generated by overlapping elements are
excluded: each experience excludes all others. So, we should think of the overall state
of consciousness of the observer before looking at the measuring device and such a state
can either be |R∗〉O or |R〉O but not both. It is a matter of the internal structure of the
cognitive systems whether they are are like one or the other. It turns out that, for the
human architecture, it is (14), which describes the interaction. But this is a contingent
fact and the theory leaves open the possibility of different cognitive architectures that lead
to a conceptual structure that corresponds to initial states like |R∗〉O. In this case, their
observation of the measuring device would be described by (17): they would be systems that
track superpositions of locations, rather than well-defined positions as we do.
5 Conclusion
Many authors since the early days of quantum mechanics have played around with the notion
that consciousness holds the key for understanding the collapse of the wave function. How-
ever, such an idea seems to suggest that consciousness lays outside of the quantum realm.
This fact, together with an absence of a formal model for the alleged interaction between
consciousness and the material world, has contributed to the lack of popularity of theories in
which “consciousness causes the collapse of the wave function.”
In this paper we have shown that it is possible to provide such a model in a fully material-
istic framework. For this purpose, we have turned to IIT, which maintains that consciousness
depends upon integration of information of a system and provides a clear way to measure it.
However, our approach does not depend on IIT being the correct theory of consciousness:
as long as there is a physical property upon which consciousness depends, and which can be
measured, then we can use such a property as a collapse operator in order to construct a
consciousness-based CSL model.
It is worth noting that the standard choice for a collapse operator, in terms of position, is of
course well justified by observations, but lacks an explanation or an independent motivation.
In our proposal, in contrast, the fact that we never observe superpositions in the position of
macroscopic objects is simply a contingent fact, derived from the cognitive architecture that
happens to gives rise to consciousness in our case. The collapse term is “cooked” to get rid
of superpositions of conscious states, but the idea that consciousness causes the collapse of
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the wave function is motivated independently.
Unlike other approaches that have postulated a role for consciousness in the collapse of
the wave function, we offer a clear and formal model of such an interaction. We are sure that
there are further conceptual questions to be attended, but we hope this model contributes to
making these approaches more attractive and to the development of alternative models. One
should not forget that it is still an open empirical question whether consciousness is really
involved in the collapse of the wave function (see Okon and Sebastián (2016) for an empirical
setup that could answer such a question).
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